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The Federal Safety Net for Commercial Banks:
Part I
From the late1970sthrough 1982,the plightofthe
thrift institutions attracted considerable attention.
A numberoflegislativemeasures wereadopted in
attemptsto shore upsavings and loans and mutual
savings banks. Atthattime, there seemed to be
little concern over the abilityofbanks, especially
large banks, to remain sound. This has changed.
The spotlight now features problems facing
commercial banks.
Captured in the spotlight, alongwith the banks,
has been the networkoffinancial supportprovided
bythe Federal Reserve, as lenderoflast resort, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as
insurerofdeposits. This Weekly Letterand the next
examine the potential problems involved in
administering this "federal safety net" for com-
mercial banks. They take a look, first, at the
lender-of-Iast-resort function ofthe Federal
Reserve, and then at federal deposit insurance.
Background
Whereasthethrifts historicallyhave been buffeted
by their exposure to interest-rate risk (because
they funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with
short-term liabilities), the banking industry has
been hitby losses related tocreditrisk-theriskof
borrowersdefaultingon loans. Muchpublicityhas
been given to the losses from energy-related
lending, which proved to be the undoingof Penn
Square Bank and affected a numberofother large
banks, includingContinental Illinois. The earnings
ofmany banks are still sufferingfrom theeffectsof
the last recession on theperformanceoftheircom-
mercialloans. And, some banks havebeen hurtby
problemsconnectedwith theirreal estate lending.
The magnitude ofthese problems is reflected in
the statistics. The numberofbank failures jumped
in 1982 and 1983, totaling48 last year. Through
Juneofthisyear, therewereover40bankfailures,
the highest half-year rate since the 1930s. The
FDIC's listofproblem banks counted morethan
690 institutions as ofJune 1984, overdouble the
figure just 18 months earlier. As worrisome as
these figures might be, whatcould be the most
serious threat to commercial banks, the large
volume ofdebtowed by less developed countries
(LDCs), still lies ahead. A major confrontation
between LDC borrowers and the banks appearsto
have been averted forthe moment, butthe future
ofthebankloanstosome ofthe LDCs, particularly
Argentina, remains in question.
Federal safety net
Against this backdropof measurably increased
risk, thebanks haveaccumulated added capital in
1983 and 1984. The capital-to-asset ratio for
insured commercial banks is estimated to be
modestly higher nowthan in the previous five or
so years, butit is still well belowthe levels ofthe
1960s. Commercial banks, however, d() not
depend solely on theirown capital to meet
financial problems orto prevent a crisis in public
confidence. Explicitand implicitguarantees that
come with the federal safety netprovided by the
Federal Reserve in its capacity as lenderof last
resort and the Federal DepositInsuranceCorpora-
tion (FDIC) considerably bolsterthe position of
banks. This federal safety net has been credited
with ensuring the stability that the banking
industry has experienced since the 1930s.
The recent rescue ofContinental Illinois attests to
the continued capacityofthe system to avert a
financial crisis.
Despite the success ofthis system, the federal
safety net has come under increased scrutiny in
part because there is a concern thatthis system of
federal aid to banks can have unintended and
undesirable side effects. With regard to the Federal
Reserve, the concern is thatthe Federal Reserve's
role as a lenderof last resort wiII conflictwith its
role as a monetary authority and the goal of
achieving price stability. In the case ofdeposit
insurance, the worry is thatthe federal guarantee
on deposits creates incentives for additional risk-
taking by banks. This problem may be exacerbated
byderegulation in banking, which may make it
more difficultto keep these incentives for risk-
taking in checkthrough supervision and regulation.
lenderof last resort...
Theweakened conditionofsome banks has raised
concerns in some quarters aboutthe FederalFRBSF
Reserve's reactions. As itprotects the financial
system by acting as a lenderof last resort, the Fed,
some fear, may make monetary policytoo expan-
sionary by providingan excessive amountof
liquidityto the banks and therefore indirectlyto
the public. WhiIethis concern is real, itis probably
overstated because the conflictcan be avoided
from a purelytechnical pointofview.
When the Federal Reserve was established in
1913, it had one prime function-to be the lender
of last resort. Itwas not involved in monetary
policy as currently defined because the gold
standard establishedthe monetary rule and left
policymakers relatively littlediscretion. The
Federal Reserve functioned primarilyto provide
"an elasticcurrency" in ordertodeterthe adverse
effects ofbanking panics on the economy.
The lender-of-Iast-resortfunction is a classic
central bank role. Commercial banks fund at least
someoftheirloanswithdepositsthatare available
on demand orthat have very short maturities;
these qualities make the deposits highly liquid. If
the public perceives that a bank is havingtrouble
with its loans (assets), itwill have every incentive
to remove its liquid uninsured deposits. The
lender-of-Iast-resort function provides liquidity in
the face ofsuch bank runs. Itdoes so bytaking
illiquid butsound loans as collateral from
commercial banks in return for providing reserves
which the banks can use to meetthedeposit
withdrawals.
...and monetary policy
It is technically possible for the central bankto
meetthis increased liquidity need withoutfollow-
ing an easier monetary policy. Take the case ofa
single bank such as Continental Illinois. The
Federal Reserve at the peak of its lending, appar,.
ently supplied a large volumeofreserves to that
institutionthrough thediscountwindow,takingin
sound but illiquid loans as collateral. This made it
possible for depositors to withdraw theirfunds
from that institution and re-deposit the funds into
institutions they thoughtwere safer. The reserves
thereby initially stayed in the banking system.
Continental Illinois also received extensive aid in
the form ofthe rescue package involvingthe FDIC
and a numberofcommercial banks. However,
onIythe Federal Reserve's actions havethepoten-
tial of increasing reserves in the entire banking
system. To preventthe increase in reserves via the
discountwindow loans to Continental Illinoisfrom
increasing the reserves ofthe banking system as a
whole, the Federa.1 Reserve could and didwithdraw
reserves from other banks via open market opera-
tions. This was donewith abouta one-week lag
and enabled the Federal Reserve to allowone
banktogetthe Iiquidityitneeded withoutincreas-
ingthe liquidityofthe entire banking system. This
is the most likelytype ofproblem a liquidity crisis
might presentto monetary policy, and it is the
easiest to deal with.
Whatwould happen in the unlikely case ofa run
on many banks simultaneously? Put differently,
whatwouId happen ifthepublicwishesto reduce
its holdings ofdeposits at all banks because it
perceivesthe bankstobe risky, and instead, prefers
to increase its holdings ofalternative (nonbank)
safe assets? In the case oftransaction deposits, the
public would desire to reduce its holdings of
checking accounts and (most likely) increase its
holdings ofcurrency, the alternative medium of
exchange. Among investmentdeposits,thepublic
mightwish to reduce its holdings oftime and
savings deposits and (most likely) increase its
holdings ofthe safest alternative asset-Treasury
securities. The Federal Reserve's role is to supply
the currency demanded bythe public-both
through open market operations and through the
discountwindow-to satisfy the public's demand
for safe and liquid assets without necessarily
easing monetary policy.
In the most probable case, where the public
converts its demand orother checkable deposits
into currency, the preViously set targets for M1
could remain operational because the public's
desire to hold M1 would notchange. The public
merely desires to decrease its holdings ofthe
transactions depositcomponentofMl and
increase its holdings ofthecurrencycomponentof
M1. As a first approximation, this changes the
composition ofM1 but not necessarily its level.
Obviously, the extent to which M1 or any other
monetary aggregate can be expected to remainwithin its target range and to continueto be a
useful guideto policyinthefaceofarun on banks
depends on the nature and the predictabilityof
the portfolio shifts made by the public. However,
the historyofbank runs suggests that such port-
folioshifts havebeen relativelypredictable; in the
past, the public has increased its demand for the
safest alternative assets-currency and Treasury
securities.
While it is technically possible to avoid expan-
sionary monetary policy in the face ofa major
need to act as a lenderof last resort, it is also
possible for human error to creep intothe opera-
tion ofmonetary policy. The potential for such
errordearly rises with the volume ofdeposits
being withdrawn from depository institutions and
the uncertainty overthe nature ofthe public's
portfolio shifts. In the 1931-33 banking crises,
which involved a large volumeofdeposit
withdrawals, the Federal Reserve appears to have
erred on thesideoffollowingtootightamonetary
policy; itdid not supply enough liquidityto meet
the demands ofthe public. The result was that the
Fed contributed to the severity ofthe recession.
Since that time, the Federal Reserve has avoided
the same mistake.
Conclusion
The problems evident in the banking industry have
spotlighted the benefits ofthe Federal Reserve
acting as lenderof last resort as partofthe federal
safety netfor banks. At the same time, concerns
have been raised that, as the Federal Reserve meets
the liquidity needs ofbanks, monetary policywill
be compromised. TheContinental IIIinoisepisode
has demonstrated clearly thatthe Federal Reserve
can address the liquidityproblems ofan individual
bankwithoutalteringmonetarypolicy. In thecase
ofa more general demand for liquidity by banks,
say, dueto the public desiring to hold relatively
more nonbank assets, there still is no inherent
conflict between the Federal Reserve's roles as
monetary authority and lenderof last resort.
A concern ofsome financial marketcommentators
seems to be that the Federal Reserve may attempt
to prevent bank runs rather than react to them by
relieving the pressure on the banking system
through apremature increase in bank reserves and
liquidity.Whilethatmighthelp reducethechances
ofa bank run developing, at least for a while, the
precaution would risk an increase in the money
supply above targeted levels and implyan easier
monetary policy. The use ofthe deposit insurance
guarantee, even for "uninsured" depositors as in
the case ofthe Continental Illinois Bank, avoids
the riskofthe Federal Reserve following an exces-
sively easy monetary policyto prevent disruptive
bank runs. However, the deposit insurance guar-
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 181,790 -1,304 5,765 6.0
Loans and Leases1 6 162,680 1,118 7,325 8.7
Commercial and Industrial 49,290 - 217 3,327 13.4
Real estate 60,423 34 1,524 4.8
Loans to Individuals 28,628 - 38 1,977 13.7
Leases 5,031 1 - 32 - 1.1
U.s. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,984 - 168 - 523 - 7.7
Other Sec.urities2 7,127 - 17 - 1,036 - 23.5
Total Deposits 189,792 -4,325 - 1,205 - 1.1
Demand Deposits 45,849 -4,237 - 3,388 - 12.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,998 2,132 - 333 - 1.9
OtherTransactiqn Balances4 12,440 - 345 - 335 - 4.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 131,502 256 2,517 3.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 38,426 - 199 - 1,171 - 5.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 39,814 399 1,649 8.0
OtherLiabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 18,931 -1,447 - 4,076 - 32.9
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, IT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately